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1. INTRODUCTION 
Regionalism had been considered as an institutional, political imbalance cause 
since the Risorgimento age. The reasons had been the fear of a potential damage of the 
national unity and especially the strong diffidence by the political parties towards models 
than cannot be controlled by the State.  
In fact, it is to be recalled the intense debate on the model of State that the 
Constituent Assembly had to adopt (1946-1947), the long time necessary in order to 
achieve the regionalism system (1948-1970) and the long period of the «regionalism 
without a model»
1
 (1971-1998). Currently (1999-today), regionalism is still an undefined 
entity
2
. It is still looking for a valuable model: that is quite evident because, after 
constitutional reforms in 1999 and 2001, the need of unity and the decisions of the 
constitutional Court have progressively justified an increased centralization of 
competences. 
  
 
2. FROM “RISORGIMENTO AGE” TO STURZO’S PROJECT 
1. The idea of autonomy originates from “Risorgimento age”, during the period of 
unification of the State. 
                                                 
1 See M. LUCIANI, Un regionalismo senza modello, Le Regioni, 1994, 131 ss. 
2 According to G. FALCON (Dieci anni dopo. Un bilancio della riforma del Titolo V, Le Regioni, 2011, 249), today, 
like yesterday and more than yesterday, regional right is a science of initiation. 
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For instance, Giuseppe Mazzini, both used to contrast federalism and to affirm 
Regions needed to be recognized by the Italian system. The importance of achieving a 
unitary State, in which all the territorial differences are taken into consideration, was also 
underlined by Cavour, who was in charge as prime minister in 1860. 
The same opinion was shared by Farini, then by Minghetti (Farini’s successor at 
home office). In 1861, Minghetti introduced some bills on regional administration. 
However, these drafts weren’t really successful.  
At least in this first period, regionalism was considered as a decentralization 
instrument and not as an instrument towards an effective autonomy. It was also seen as a 
useful way to coordinate and put together all the pre-unification States
3
.  
Differently from Mazzini, in 1860 Carlo Cattaneo stated that each Region of Italy 
properly is not an administrative system, but it involves a complete legislative “building”4. 
Cattaneo, who had a positive opinion on autonomy and on territorial 
differentiation, affirmed that a federal State was the only instrument able to guarantee a full 
exercise of freedom against any centralized and bureaucratic tendency.  
Giuseppe Ferrari added a federal solution according which it was impossible to 
realize a unitary system, since only federation would have given value to the different 
Regions. Federation would have been possible only thanks to a social revolution of 
farmers
5
. 
                                                 
3 For more details, see R. RUFFILLI, La questione regionale dall’unificazione alla dittatura, Giuffrè, Milano, 1971.  
4 C. CATTANEO, L’ordinamento del regno, taken from the preface of “Il Politecnico”, vol. IX, luglio 1860, now in 
G. GALASSO (edited by), Antologia degli scritti politici di Carlo Cattaneo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1962, 148.  
5 G. FERRARI, La Rivoluzione e i rivoluzionari in Italia, F. DELLA PERUTA (edited by), Univ. economica, Milano, 
1952, 9-10. 
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2. Before Sturzo, few people had considered Regions as autonomous entities; they 
were just considered as administrative subjects.  
Generally, Regions were supposed to be mere bureaucratic, hierarchical, or at least 
self-sufficient instruments of decentralization. 
Regarding bureaucratic decentralization, it can be seen as a relocation of some 
deliberative competencies from the central to the local system. In this case, some functions 
that are granted to the State are shifted to a peripheral power that is likely to be more able to 
satisfy the local needs
6
. 
Self-sufficient decentralization is completely different: it involves a relocation of 
administrative functions from the State to Regions and local entities, which are going to be 
fully responsible for their elections. 
According to Zanobini’s opinion, the concept of self-sufficient decentralization 
involves the capacity up to the legal personality, whose interests are suitable with to some 
interests of State, to exercise an administrative activity, which has the same nature and the 
same effects of the State public administration
7
. 
3- Trying to establish a date when regionalism was born, the speech given by Don 
Luigi Sturzo in Venice on 23
rd
 October 1921 during the third national Congress of Popular 
Italian Party is to be quoted
8
. He focused three crucial issues for regionalism: 
administrative decentralization, reform of local autonomies, and creation of Regions. 
                                                 
6 C. VITTA, Il regionalismo, Soc. An. Ed. La Voce, Firenze, 1923, 5-6.  
7 See G. ZANOBINI, L’amministrazione locale, Cedam, Padova, 1935, 139. 
8 See L. STURZO, Il Partito Popolare Italiano, I, Zanichelli, Bologna, 1956, 194-231. 
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These three aspects were at the heart of Sturzo’s political program, that was meant 
to find a new entity, no more only self-sufficient, but also autonomous and able to carry out 
a governmental and legislative action regarding its own matters, financially autonomous 
and directly elected by citizens. 
Consequently, Region would have been considered as a real summa of local 
collective interests, consisting of an elective-representative entity. In other words, it would 
have been characterized by universal and direct suffrage elections with the proportional 
method; it would be completely autonomous-self-sufficient and administrative-legislative, 
able to make law and rules in its territory. 
 
 
3. CONSTITUENT PERIOD 
After the collapse of fascism, regionalism became the main topic of the Italian 
political debate and the essential aspect of all antifascist programs. These programs used to 
consider Region as an important way to rebuild the State in a democratic form. 
Gaspare Ambrosini tried strongly supporting regionalism, analyzing it on legal and 
not only political base (as his predecessors did). 
However, the passage from the previous centralized State to a social State of 
autonomies wasn’t declining at all. This happened even when the Second Subcommittee in 
the Constituent Assembly, which debated the constitutional organization of State in 1946, 
took the hard decision concerning the model of State. Surely, extreme federal and 
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confederal proposals would have been introduced and somebody would have suggested to 
abolish each form of autonomy
9
. 
Only after a long debate, the Second Subcommittee approved the well-known 
Piccioni’s Agenda. Thanks to him, all the characteristics of the Region model had been 
defined. It was meant: 
1) as a self-sufficient entity equipped with its own regional objectives; it is 
able to manage all the administrative activity to achieve these objectives; 
2) autonomous: equipped with legislative and regulatory powers as regards 
its competences, by sticking to the State legal order; 
3) representative of local interests (direct universal suffrage); 
4) equipped with sufficient financial autonomy. 
However, despite of the efforts made by people pro-regionalism, especially 
Ambrosini, the Constituent Assembly disrupted the original project by rejecting Regions 
and disagreeing with the “autonomous opinion”.  
Consequently, the committee designed a project not particularly autonomous from 
a legislative point of view, but from an administrative and financial one. The regime 
established in “Titolo V” of Constitution appeared as a collection of incomplete rules, 
which needed to be implemented by the Parliament, in the attempt to give rise to a 
regionalism that remained without a model for long time. 
 
                                                 
9 La Costituzione della Repubblica nei lavori preparatori della Assemblea Costituente, VII, Camera dei deputati, 
Segretariato generale, Roma, 1971, 819-894. 
 _____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
7 
4. THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE REGIONALISM: 50S-70S 
Since the first attempts to implement the “Titolo V” of Constitution (see law 
62/1963), the legislator’s intention to minimize all the powers of Regions was evident.  
Meanwhile, the political environment was quite indifferent to regionalism. Even 
“Democrazia Cristiana”, which had included in its program the “fight” to achieve Regions 
autonomy thanks to Ambrosini and Amorth, still agreed with regionalism, but realized that 
the radical change of left parties perspectives would have sanctioned their victory in many 
Regions in the centre of Italy. Consequently, “Democrazia Cristiana” would have lost much 
control on important areas all around the country. 
Left parties, in fact, sure of their victory in the centre of Italy, used to consider 
those territories as potential sites to establish their government, instead of the Capital that 
was inaccessible. This is why politicians pro “Democrazia Cristiana” used to have a wait-
and-see approach; they wanted to approve a group of laws that would have conferred to the 
Regions a typical administrative nature, by shrinking them in a strict web of checks and 
limitations. 
In the 50s-60s, the idea of autonomy started overlapping firstly with the problem 
of the structure of institutions, then with the problem of the agreements between parties. 
These obstacles would have certainly weakened the debate on Regions. 
Regional councils, finally elected on 7
th
 – 8th June 1970, immediately regional 
Statutes approved.  
However, this situation did not really solve the functioning problems of these new 
subjects: they in fact needed some specific decrees to transfer all functions, offices and 
staff. 
These decrees were promulgated on 14
th
-15
th
 January 1972. They enabled Regions 
to execute administrative functions in the following matters: municipal districts and local 
police, mineral waters, caves and bogs, educational assistance, museums and libraries, 
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healthcare, transports, tourism, hospitality industry, fairs and markets, urban planning, 
viability and expropriation, public charity, professional and craft education, agriculture, 
hunting and fishing. 
This transfer created lots of discussion among people pro regionalism.  
Only after repetitive custom complaints, which were meant to obtain some 
financial aids that were essential to execute the political address of each Region, “d.p.r.” n. 
6/1977 was adopted. For at least 20 years it proved to be the fundamental text
10
, even more 
than article 117 of Constitution, as regards to the distribution of powers between the State 
and the Regions. 
This document firstly realized a transfer of administrative functions to the 
Regions, by putting together the entire set of competencies previously divided into 4 
different matters by Constitution: administrative arrangement and organization, social 
services, economic development, urban planning. 
Here we were at the start point of regionalism that began to operate a 
decentralization of functions after a long period of debates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See M.S. GIANNINI, Prefazione, in A. BARBERA, F. BASSANINI, I nuovi poteri delle regioni e degli enti locali, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1978, 7.  
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5. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN STATE AND REGIONS IN THE 
OLD “TITOLO V” OF CONSTITUTION 
1- As stated above, Regions started to operate during the 70s. Since then to the 
second half of 90s, the main problem consisted of a lack of connection instruments and 
coordination provisions towards both ordinary legislation and administrative policy too. 
Constitutional Court was constantly up to smooth out all the relationships among 
State and Regions. It caught the mechanism of closure of the entire system in the clause of 
national interest (article 117: Regions would have been allowed to adopt legislative rules as 
regards to specific competencies provided that they wouldn’t have been in contrast with 
national interests and interests of other Regions). 
In particular, what was worthy to be considered as national interest was defined by 
the State, both by general and detailed norms and sometimes in contrast with Constitution. 
Conversely, Regions would have adhered to the State rules in favor of national interests. 
In this way, judges had meanwhile transformed the national interest from a 
national limitation to an assumption of legitimacy of regional laws
11
, by subtracting it from 
the judge by the Parliament. This is why Regions, at least until the reform of “Titolo V” of 
Constitution, were established as purely administrative subjects.  
2- Among all the strategies to shrink the legislative competencies of Regions, an 
important role was performed by the State function of “indirizzo e coordinamento” of all 
regional activities, certainly one of the most evident ways to show national interest in this 
complex model of Italian autonomy. 
It consisted of an instrument able to be an internal limitation to single 
competencies of regional interest, thought as a unitary regulatory scheme allowed to 
                                                 
11 R. BIN, Legge regionale, Dig. disc. pubbl., IX, Utet, Torino, 1994, 188. 
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guarantee the connection between State and Regions as regards to all competencies 
designed by article 117 of Constitution
12
. 
Moreover, according to the constitutional Court, it was an essential instrument to 
guarantee a uniform direction, in case either of unitary necessities that needed to be 
coordinated or of sacrificing regional interests.  
However, this function would have disappeared later, because of constitutional 
laws in 1999 and 2001 (see par. 6). 
3- A further strategy of flexibility between State and Regions involved substitutive 
powers, which were aimed to prevent the prejudice that the regional administrative inertia 
could have brought either to the protection of main values or to the achievement of 
common objectives. 
In fact, since 1972, constitutional Court had been complaining about the lack of 
substitutive powers, which would have let the State to exceptionally replace helpless or 
failed Regions as regards to the actuation of the EU duties.  
However, once it had been approved, this normative replacement lost quite soon 
its exception character and it progressively transformed into the most updated product of 
the opening State supremacy towards regional autonomies
13
. 
4- Finally, it is important to remember a further turning point as regards to the 
previous system, as follows: the “norme cedevoli”. 
                                                 
12 See F. PIZZETTI, Autonomia della Regione e funzione di indirizzo e coordinamento, AA.VV., Contributi allo 
studio della funzione statale di indirizzo e coordinamento, Ministero dell’interno, Roma, 1978, 73.  
13 See P. CARETTI, Il potere sostitutivo statale: un problema di garanzie procedurali o sostanziali per l’autonomia 
regionale?, Le Regioni, 1990, 1857.  
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It is of a doctrinal mechanism
14
 through which the State, in order to prevent any 
normative lacks in regional legislations as regards to shared competencies, could not only 
establish precept rules, but also tractable detailed arrangements, which would have later 
failed when Regions would have decided to apply their own attributions.  
However, still in this case, once this praxis had been approved, the legislator, 
supported by the constitutional Court, began to misuse it, by shrinking regional autonomies. 
 
 
6. THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORMS IN 1999-2001 
1- Limitations of that system emerged during the 90s, when the organization of 
relationships between State and Regions started to be considered, thinking that regional 
competencies needed to be extended and that is was essential to prevent the State from 
obtaining further competencies.  
Once the experiment of the bicameral boards (1993- De Mita-Iotti / 1997- 
D’Alema), which had to achieve the reform of the second part of Constitution, failed, the 
aim of reallocate all competencies was still carried out through some ordinary laws.  
We are talking about “Bassanini’s laws”, involving lots of devolution to the 
government in order to transfer functions to the Regions, for the reform of public 
administration and, finally, for the administrative simplification. Particularly, we refer to 
                                                 
14 See L. PALADIN, Diritto regionale, Cedam, Padova, 1979, 96. 
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the laws n. 59 and n. 127 in 1997, n. 191 in 1998, and some legislative decrees (the most 
important was certainly n. 112 in 1998
15
). 
The logic followed by this reform was deeply innovative and aimed to realize a 
complete decentralization of competencies to the regional autonomies, without selecting 
any competencies and guaranteeing to the State some specific functions (public order, 
defense, foreign affairs…). 
According to the contents of these laws (formally legislative, practically 
constitutional), it was usual to talk about “administrative federalism with unchanged 
Constitution”. In fact, the measures taken into consideration introduced a model of 
relationships between State and Regions that was really in contrast with the old “Titolo V”, 
to the point that an immediate constitutional reform was expedited (this reform was finally 
established through constitutional laws n. 1 in 1999 and n. 3 in 2001). 
2- These laws have actually cancelled or modified most of the articles that used 
make up “Titolo V” of Constitution, by redesigning the layout of regional sources and their 
relationships with the State ones
16
.  
In particular, this reform has deeply modified the general partition of the 
competencies between State and Regions by conferring seventeen of them to the State (the 
list is found in article 117, § 2, of Constitution). These competences would have 
represented an exception to the general principle of regional competence; a list of shared 
competencies (article 117, § 3, of Constitution); a federal clause (art. 117, § 4, of 
Constitution) whose content isn’t clear at all. 
                                                 
15 See G. FALCON (edited by), Lo stato autonomista: funzioni statali, regionali e locali nel decreto legislativo n. 
112 del 1998 di attuazione della legge Bassanini n. 59 del 1997, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1998. 
16 Ex plurimis, see A. RUGGERI, Le fonti del diritto regionale: ieri, oggi, domani, Giappichelli, Torino, 2001.  
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Both the doctrine and constitutional Court have found in article 117 an 
heterogeneous and varied
17
 amount of competencies. A part from some individual clauses 
that are real competencies, there are some others with a transverse character (concurrency 
protection, essential levels of performances…), that the Court has progressively redefined 
by looking at every practical situation, by taking into consideration all the involved 
interests
18
. 
In particular, “finalistic competencies” (also known as “value matters”, or “matters 
not matters”), represent some strategies of constitutional engineering specifically created in 
order to balance the gaps of “Titolo V”, through which the State can legitimately expand 
the exercise of its legislative function also in areas which would formally belong to 
Regions. 
They show the way through which national interest, even if it has been cancelled 
by the national legislator, has appeared again in our Constitution adopting a different 
nature. 
3- A further instrument of flexibility that the Court has exploited in the last ten 
years in order to rewrite “Titolo V” of Constitution consists of the “chiamata in 
sussidiarietà”19. 
Since the well-known decision n. 303 in 2003, judges have stated that, in case of 
the rise of unitary necessities, even in terms of regional legislative competencies, some 
State interventions are not to be excluded. This is an actuation of the principle of 
                                                 
(17) See S. MANGIAMELI, La riforma del regionalismo italiano, Giappichelli, Torino, 2002, 107 ss. 
(18) See A. BARBERA, La polverizzazione delle materie regionali e la (ormai necessaria) clausola di supremazia, 
Le Regioni, 2011, 557 ss.; R. BIN, I criteri di individuazione delle materie, ibid., 2006, 889 ss. 
19 See C. MAINARDIS, Chiamata in sussidiarietà e strumenti di raccordo nei rapporti Stato-Regioni, Le Regioni, 
2011, 455 ss. 
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subsidiarity as regards to the legislative function, so that the actuation of the examined 
criterion from an administrative point of view finally affects legislation too. 
It is important to say that the “chiamata in sussidiarietà” always consists of an 
exception to the layout of competences of State and Regions, even if it is valid only in the 
following three situations: a) there must be an accurate evaluation of unitary necessities that 
are subordinate to the State in terms of specific administrative functions; b) this exception 
must be reasonable; c) the Regions have to been consulted. This agreement between State 
and Region is a condicio sine qua non, so that the principle of subsidiarity can operate 
dynamically by centralizing some functions that would formally belong to Regions. 
4- The decision n. 303 in 2003 has also declared inadmissibility of “norme 
cedevoli”. 
These ones, after the reform in 2001, would never be used by the State in terms of 
shared competences and in terms of residual competence of Regions too
20
.  
According to the Court, the institute of “norme cedevoli” would survive only if the 
State would attract administrative functions to satisfy unitary necessities: only in this case 
the State could intervene through detailed “norme cedevoli” as regards to the concurrent 
legislation, waiting for the new regional rules. 
5- Finally, the reform in 2001 has introduced the mechanism of regulatory 
replacement (art. 120 of Constitution).  
Nowadays it is possible to mention three substitutive powers
21
: 
                                                 
20 See R. BIN, L’interesse nazionale dopo la riforma: continuità dei problemi, discontinuità della giurisprudenza 
costituzionale, Le Regioni, 2001, 1213 ss. 
21 See F. MERLONI, Una definitiva conferma della legittimità dei poteri sostitutivi regionali, Le Regioni, 2004, 
1080 ss. 
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a) substitutive powers introduced by the State and regional law as regards to 
delegated administrative functions. Here the subject that delegates keeps the ownership of 
the function, by replacing Regions in case of inertia; 
b) ordinary substitutive powers provided by law and about administrative 
functions. There is a general interest that the function is carried out;  
c) extraordinary substitutive powers of government, as regards to normative acts, 
to be executed towards Regions and other local autonomies (delegated administrative 
functions). In this case, it’s important to safeguard all the unitary interests that are really 
essential for the system functioning. 
 
 
7. SOME CONCLUSIONS 
The greatest problem of Italian regionalism is the current gap between Constitution 
and reality
22
, which is represented by article 117 of Constitution. 
Thanks to this rule it is possible to realize that a group of competencies have quite 
flexible contours; they are nearly always allocated to the State, as established by 
constitutional Court, which created some mechanism to balance some lacks of “Titolo V”. 
Few and specific competencies are allocated to Regions, so that many regional 
competencies now actually look like dry branches
23
. Furthermore, the reform attitude has 
                                                 
22 For more details, see A. CANDIDO, Confini mobili. Il principio autonomista nei modelli teorici e nelle prassi del 
regionalismo italiano, Giuffrè, Milano, 2012. 
23 See G. FALCON, Dieci anni dopo. Un bilancio della riforma del Titolo V, cit., 245.  
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been denied and Constitution, especially in legislative competence, involves some rules that 
are typical of federal States but actually it has never managed to stick to the real necessities 
of our society. Consequently, it has not a social acceptance
24
. 
The fail of regionalism derives from a blocking of Italian politics, so that, 
according to Roberto Bin, Regions have not even been created by the Constituent 
Assembly, and they have purely been invented from all points of view, only because of a 
political necessity. Looking at the uncertain political future of our country, political parties 
have considered regionalism as a way to guarantee their survival in case of their failure in 
occasion of political elections
25
. 
Furthermore, the reform makes the relationships between State and Regions 
extremely complicated and it has obtained the increase of the constitutional contentious, 
making the Court able to progressively interpret the text of Constitution
26
. 
This happened, at the beginning, by conferring to Regions some autonomy, a part 
from a progressive centralizing process towards the State, thanks to some new instruments 
that have replaced the old national interest. 
From the general layout, it emerges that this centralization process is still 
prevailing as regards all the following cornerstones of the regional autonomy principles: 
self-government, self-conferring different functions, normative and financial autonomy. Let 
us just think about either the failure of the perspective to achieve fiscal federalism or the 
lack of an efficient government of all the resources, or the weak legitimacy of regional 
politics. 
                                                 
24 See T. GROPPI, Il Titolo V cinque anni dopo, ovvero la Costituzione di carta, Le Regioni, 2007, 428. 
25 See R. BIN, …e l’autonomia politica? Riflessioni del dopo-elezioni, in Le Regioni, 2008, 244. 
26 See U. DE SIERVO, Conclusioni, Le Regioni, 2011, 593.  
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Nowadays it is necessary to reform the system of regional autonomies, especially 
because of the current economic-financial crisis and the consequent crisis of State and its 
finances. 
Regions should actually be effective and efficient subjects, actively participating to 
the modernization of our country. 
It will be possible to reach this target only in a strong system in which fundamental 
rights are equally guaranteed to all citizens regardless of the place they live. At the same 
time, it is necessary to encourage differentiation. All this by being aware that an extremely 
uniform model would only accentuate the gap between our Regions. 
